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Toward a Rule-Based Model of Human Choice: 




Anglo-American jurisprudence emphasizes the rule of reason; it grossly neglects the
reason of rules. We play socioeconomic-legal-political games that can be described
empirically only by their rules. But most of us play without an understanding or ap-
preciation of the rules, how they came into being, how they are enforced, how they
can be changed, and most important, how they can be normatively evaluated. (Bren-
nan and Buchanan, 1985, preface).
I. Introduction: Homo Constitutionalus
At several points during his long career, Buchanan wrote on human nature, the pro-
cess of making choices, and weaknesses in the Neoclassical conceptions of the same. That
line of his research stressed the selection and evolution of personal goals and constraints. It
was not a major focus of his research, and his writing in this area often simply attempted to
remind economists that their utility-maximizing model of man was just a “model” and one
that has significant limitations. In his economic and constitutional research, he routinely
used conventional rational choice models.1 
Given the latter, it is possible that Buchanan regarded the homo economicus model to be
adequate for most analytical purposes in spite of its weaknesses. Another possibility is that
he was too simply busy on other projects to develop the rule-based, constitutional model of
human nature that would bridge the gap between his comments on human nature and his
work on political economy. This paper provides that missing model.




             
                
            
             
                  
                
              
                
               
            
                 
            
             
             
               
             
           
              
            
               
             
             
         
            
         
               
            
               
                 
The model sketched out below is grounded loosely on Buchanan’s writings, but it is
not an attempt to read his mind. Rather, it undertakes the task of developing a more com-
plete model of human thought and action—one that is consistent with Buchanan’s remarks
on human nature and ethics—and also with other work in psychology, biology, and philoso-
phy. I believe that he would agree with most of what is written below, but that can no longer
be put to the test, and it is not the main aim of the essay.
The analysis begins with what Hayek (1952) referred to as the “sensory order,” which
is to say the idea that our information about the external world is provided by our various
senses, none of which are perfect but which nonetheless cannot be too often mistaken or
misleading without undermining our species’s prospects for survival. Our senses do not pro-
vide our “sensory order” but rather provide the data that our minds use to construct one.
This paper suggests that various systems of relatively stable rules ultimately determine
our sensory orders—which is to say our perceptions concerning both the real and the possi-
ble. Systems of rules determine our understanding of the world, our beliefs about what can
be changed, and the meanings of “better” and “best” as applied to choices among possible
actions that might be undertaken. Our internal systems of rules thus largely determine how
and what we choose to do in both our mental and physical universes.
The rule-based alternative to homo economicus sketched out in this essay is termed homo
constitutionalus. It is a more general model of humankind than the utility-maximizing model 
used in economics and game theory. It addresses many of the weaknesses of the homo eco-
nomicus model noted by Buchanan. And, although homo constitutionalus is not as mathematically
tractable as homo economicus, special cases of the model can be used to model and predict
choices and actions in well-understood circumstances. Indeed, the utility-maximizing model 
is one such special case. Simple autocorrelation (habitual) models of behavior are another.
II. A Generalized Conception of Rules: Rules as “If-Then” Relationships
Buchanan often used the term “rules of the game” as a way of illustrating that choices
take place within a hierarchy of rule-governed domains. Choices over rules bind choices
made after those rules are adopted and implemented. One chooses rules for a game and then
plays the game by choosing strategies allowed by the rules of the game. Such rules are taken
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to be “given” or “binding” for choices made while playing the game of interest. Although he
normally stressed just two-levels of choice, he occasionally mentioned that a hierarchy of
rules existed. In Limits to Liberty (1975), for example, he reviews a three-level hierarchy of
laws: (i) civil laws, (ii) constitutional law, and (iii) public policy decisions, which jointly frame
a fourth level of choice: day-to-day decision making within a society characterized by the rule
of law. His work also includes at least two other categories of rules: rules that provide proce-
dures for making choices (Buchanan 1979, 1998, 2005) and rules that constrain choices to
various subsets of the possible (Brennan and Buchanan 1985). Hierarchies, procedures, and
constraints all play roles in the framework developed below.
Although Buchanan uses the term “rules” frequently, he never defined what he meant
by a “rule.” For the purposes of this essay, rules are “if-then” relationships. Any and all rela-
tionships that can be characterized by if-then statements are said to be rules. Interpreted in
this way, the term “rule” encompasses a very broad range of human experience and
knowledge. If-then relationships include most—if not all—definitions, natural and social
causal relationships, ethical propositions, moral maxims, personal routines for adapting to
weather, work, and family, and also, rules for parlor games and politics. If-then relationships
are by their nature systematic and allow predictions about consequences to be made.
The following examples illustrate if-then relationships that we all use or might use: (i)
If an object is round, orange colored, and releases orange drinkable juice when squeezed, then
it is probably an orange. (ii) If one simultaneously drops two unequally sized oranges from 
the top of a tall building, then they will hit the ground at the same time. (iii) If a frost wipes
out half of the Earth’s crop of oranges, then the price of orange juice will increase. (iv) If one
drinks a glass of orange juice in the morning, then he or she is likely to be more alert for the
next hour than if he or she had not done so and possibly a bit less likely to catch a cold. (v) If
the light at a crosswalk is red, then one should not cross the street—except in an emergency.
(vi) If one is in normal circumstances (not at war or threatened with death), then it is immoral
and illegal to kill another person—even if one “sees red” because he or she has been in-
sulted. (vii) If one is playing poker, then a hand in which every card has a red diamond on it
beats a hand with two pairs or three of a kind.
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There are so many if-then relationships that it is useful to subdivide them into various
categories such as natural law, constitutional law, regulatory law, moral maxims, rules of
thumb, rubrics, and so forth. Such classification schemes are normally done with other if-
then statements. For example, if a rule describes part of the standing procedures through
which public policies are chosen, then it is a constitutional law, whether formally or infor-
mally so.
If-then relationships also characterize what we mean by true and false. (viii) The hy-
pothesis “if O, then X” is perfectly true if it is always the case that if “O,” then “X.” (ix) It is
stochastically true if “O” occurs, then probably “X” also occurs. Furthermore, (x) it is
demonstratively false if “O” then not “X” (e.g., X is never observed when O occurs). (xi) Hi-
erarchies among rules can also be expressed using if-then statements. Rule “b” can be ap-
plied, only if it is allowed under rule “a,” that is, if rule “a” allows rule “b,” then rule “b” can
be applied whenever rule “a” is in force.
Note that only a small subset of the rules that we use characterize “rules of a game”
or serve as “constraints.” The term “rules” has far broader scope than that implied by Bu-
chanan’s usage of that term. Moreover, even in cases in which a system of rules is used to
characterize a game, such rules normally do not fully characterize how a game is played or
how one truly wins the game. Other higher-level “internalized” rules are taken as given by
the designers of card and board games, and these have significant effects on the nature of
and participation in the game.
For example, the formal rules of a game of poker characterizes the types of cards one
should use, how they are to be distributed to players, the card strategies allowed, and pro-
vides a ranking of possible collections of cards (hands) at the end of a round of play. The
rules imply that one wins a round (dealing of the deck) if he or she has the “highest” hand. 
However, the aim of winning in this sense may not be the main goal of individual card play-
ers. A variety of other rules in the minds of the players actually determine how they play the
game, why they play the game, and who truly wins. 
Such rules include internalized rules about various strategies one might use. Will one
cheat—mark cards, try to see other player’s hands, be calm or emotive, threaten other
page 4
 
                 
               
               
               
               
              
 
               
                 
               
              
              
               
                 
            
           
                 
               
                
                
                 
           
              
                                            
   
 
    
  
  
   
   
  
players with violence, file charges for fraud if others cheat, and so on? And will one try to
win as many hands as possible or simply play because the conversations and reactions that
arise during the course of play tend to be funny, entertaining, or informative. Many, perhaps
most, participants in parlor games play the game simply to observe the reactions of fellow
players and to be part of the associated conversations—they care little about winning in the
manner the rules suggest. The number of hands won is of secondary importance to such
players.
If conversation is the aim, then the more interesting the other players are, the greater
are the rewards of participating. If winning money from side bets is the aim, then weaker and
wealthier players are ideal poker companions. If a challenge to take one’s mind off one’s day-
to-day life is the aim, one might want competent, honest, and humorous opponents, rather
than overly chatty or incompetent ones.2 (Competence in this case, refers to knowledge of
the if-then rules of probability as applied to card games, and of psychology as applied to 
reading faces and body language.) Even in cases in which winning hands is the aim, it is of-
ten because winning improves one’s reputation for shrewdness or generates status for per-
sons in the greater world beyond the parlor games of interest.3 
The rules for parlor games are only a subset of the rules one uses to determine how
one plays “the game.” Who one plays with, how one selects strategies, and how one evalu-
ates the merits of spending a night playing such games, are largely determined by other rules
in the minds of the participants. How one plays a game, how one really wins, and who one
plays with are all determined by other rules in the minds of the players at the table—rules
that are entirely separate from the formal rules of poker. Those other internalized rules ulti-
mately determine how the game is played. The same is true of constitutional rules, as
2 The poker games in Blacksburg that Buchanan attended included Robert Tollison and Winston
Bush among others.
3 The various “social” payoffs of parlor games are less obvious for games played on the Internet or
against computers. Such games may provide relief from one’s everyday toils as well as status within
the context of the game through rankings of accumulated scores. The latter may generate self-confi-
dence or self-esteem for the persons participating. Only a few “addicts” and “fanatics” allow the
number of games won to be their entire reason for play (or life). Indeed, the derogatory nature of
the terms “addicts” and “fanatics” implies that such persons are unusual—exceptions to the rule, 
exceptions to the less winning oriented theory of game playing sketched out above.
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acknowledged by the terms written and unwritten constitutional laws.
It is these and other internalized rules that are the main focus of this essay.
III. Homo Constitutionalus: Rule Bound But Not Rule Determined
Each person is, of course, a product of his own history, the cultural environment, the
conventions and traditions that exist and the public literature that explains these, all
of which combine to describe the inclusive status quo that cannot be literally super-
seded.…This statement does not, however, imply…that a person, any person, is
locked permanently into a predisposition as determined by personal history, experi-
ence and social environment. (Buchanan, 2005, p. 102)
We move through time, constructing ourselves as artifactual persons. We are not, 
and cannot be, the “same person” in any utility-maximizing sense. (Buchanan,1979/
1999, 250–51)
The homo constitutionalus characterization of human nature begins with the observa-
tions that adults have many internalized rules, can internalize new rules and overturn previ-
ously internalized rules, and that doing so is often a matter of choice. These four observa-
tions imply that humans are rule bound but not fully rule determined. One is rule bound in-
sofar as one’s internalized rules create dispositions to make particular choices, but one is free
to choose insofar as new rules can be internalized and old ones revised or selectively ig-
nored.4 
Our internalized systems of rules have three sources: genetic, social, and personal.
The first accounts for the largest subset of our rules and includes the biological foundations 
of our human capacities and prerequisites for sustaining a human life. Such rules distinguish
humankind from other species. We have one mouth, 1 brain, 2 legs, 2 eyes, 10 fingers, etcet-
era. We cannot fly; can run only at moderate speeds; require water, food, and sleep to sur-
vive; can imagine alternative futures; and can communicate in a relatively finely grained man-
ner with others of our species who speak the same language. The other two sources of inter-
nalized rules are of greater interest for the purposes of this essay because they are more vari-
able. They are grounded in the capacities inherent in the human genotype but are not direct
4 For other complementary rule-based models of man see Hayek (1952), Newell and Simon (1972), 
Nozick (1994), or Seligman et al. (2016). This essay differs from others in its use of more general
meaning of the term “rules,” by its emphasis on the internalization processes, and by its linkages to
economics and Buchanan’s work, but there are many overlaps and common themes.
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products of it. In the language of computer design, genetics provide the hardware and firm-
ware; society and personal invention provide our software. Socially transmitted rules are
largely what distinguish modern man from the ancient cave dwellers of the same genotype. 
Most of our “software” has been learned from others. It is that which accounts for
our longer and more comfortable lives. Socially transmitted rules initially were simply private
or personal rules. They were invented or discovered by individuals at some point in the past,
who found them useful for their own purposes. When new or refined rules reduce risks or
enhance possibilities, they may be passed on to others in one’s family and tribe and subse-
quently across generations. When they are deemed counterproductive by others, they are less
likely to be copied or passed along, except as examples of rules to be avoided. As the collec-
tion of useful rules expands through time, their origins tend to be forgotten and only the
rules themselves are passed along to others and internalized—often without much thought.
The individual acts of learning that produce human knowledge account for the small-
est subset of an individual’s own system of rules. They are the rules that were refined, in-
vented, or discovered by that individual, many of which were catalyzed by conversations
with others. Many, perhaps most of one’s private internalized rules will never go further than
his or her own mind, but a few may be passed onto others, who find them sufficiently useful 
to be internalized and passed on to their friends, neighbors, and colleagues. Although this
process arguably produces the smallest of our subsets of internalized rules, through time the
accumulated individual innovations are the ultimate source of human progress. Without our
ability to invent and learn new rules, we would still be cave dwellers (at best).
The remainder of this subsection provides a more thorough discussion of these three
sources of our internalized rules and how they generate dispositions to engage in one or an-
other responses to the choice settings confronted. 
A. Genetically Transmitted Rules
It is sometimes said, “we are what we eat,” but it would be more precise to say, “we
eat to be what we are.” Although it is literally the case that most of our cells are composed
of the raw materials collected through our mouths, the use that we make of those raw mate-
rials is a consequence of our biology, which in turn is a consequence of our genetic code(s).
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That code provides the rules that determine both what we can eat and how what we eat is
used to create our physical persons. It does not, however, determine precisely what we eat, 
nor precisely who we are. What we eat is largely determined by our knowledge of nature and
how it may be used to please our taste buds, while sustaining life. Limoncello, spaghetti,
meatballs, and panna cotta were not available to cave dwellers.
How the food is used depends in part on the extent and type of exercise that we un-
dertake as well as our genotype. Our physical persons are bound by a huge number of if-
then relationships, only a subset of which is understood by ourselves or the scientists who
study human physiology and psychology.
We know, for example, that we need some water, some food, and some sleep on a
regular basis. We understand why we need food and water but do not really understand why
most of us need to spend about a third of our life preparing for or sleeping. Nor do we un-
derstand what—if anything—our dreams add to our ability to survive and pass our genes to
the next generation. Yet, if we sleep well, then we always dream at least part of the time we
are asleep.5 
Genetically transmitted rules include those that produce and maintain the sense or-
gans that provide us with data about the world and the brains that attempt to make sense of
that data. We process this data more or less automatically, so we take for granted our many
common conclusions about the nature of the world that we inhabit. The difficulty of making
sense from a collection of raw data about the world was not fully appreciated until engineers
and computer scientists attempted to devise machines—robots, self-driving cars, and voice-
decoding software—to do what humans do automatically “without” much thought. Our
“hardware,” “firmware,” and “software” have to be extraordinarily sophisticated—indeed
marvelous—to do so.
One’s visual system allows one to distinguish among objects. One’s auditory system
allows us to identify the sounds of a familiar voice. With training and practice, one can make
5 The dream state (REM) is one of the three phases of sleep. There are several theories of the pur-
pose of dreams, most of which involve information processing of various kinds but a few of which
simply regard them to be unnecessary correlates with a good sleep. See, for example, Freud (1913), 
Jung (1938/2005), Revonsuo (2000), or Zhang (2004).
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sense of the sounds spoken by others and also of the many sounds that tend to be associated 
with opportunities for food, water, and danger. One’s sense of touch allows one to distin-
guish among all sorts of materials. One’s sense of balance allows one to stand on one foot,
run, and climb trees. Together with our ability to learn, most of us can assemble an IKEA
chair without years spent reprogramming ourselves. No robot can yet do all of these or even
a significant subset of these things—even after a half century of hard work by thousands of
very talented scientists and engineers.6 
The basic parameters of our physical capacities to hear, see, lift, manipulate, and run
are all biologically set—although with training we can get a bit better at each of these capaci-
ties, albeit within limits that are also genetically determined. 
What is most relevant for the purposes of this essay are the internal systems of rules
that affect how we make choices. A subset of these rules can be said to be “hard wired,” but
there are many others that can be modified or overturned, just as training for a marathon can
increase one’s natural aerobic capacity, strength, and endurance beyond that of an ordinary
person who does not train. For example, one can “overcome” one’s instinctive fear of fire,
heights, and death. One can hold onto hot objects to the point where one is burned, para-
chute from airplanes, charge enemy lines, or commit suicide.
The human ability to override genetically transmitted propensities, evidently improves
our chances for survival. Our ability to learn new rules also makes us all more adaptable and
malleable than simple models of genetic determinism suggest. These capacities both improve
our chances of survival in an ever-changing world and extend the domain of humankind by
increasing the number of ecosystems in which we can flourish.
Our capacities to communicate and learn new rules are among those that can be en-
hanced by informal and formal systems of education.
6 In the spring of 2018, two robots were able to assemble a relatively simple IKEA chair in about 20 
minutes. However, the programming was limited to a single type of chair. Numerous videos of the
robots are available. See, for example, https://www.zdnet.com/article/robot-builds-an-ikea-chair-
everyone-goes-nuts. Needless to say, a cave dweller might well have taken longer but not a modern
man or woman who had assembled such chairs before.
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B. Socially Transmitted Rules
Most of our socially transmitted rules were learned without giving alternative rules or
principles much thought, as parents, friends, and neighbors encouraged us to reach particu-
lar conclusions about particular circumstances, evaluate the consequences of our actions in
particular ways, and act in certain ways in particular circumstances or when our actions will 
have particular consequences.
Perhaps the most obvious of our socially transmitted skills is our native tongue, the
if-then relationships between sounds, characters, and ideas learned in our households and
communities when we were children. Currently, more than 5,000 languages exist and the one
that most of us know best was learned during our childhood. So varied are these rules, that
individuals who know just one of the 5,000 languages, are unable to communicate with per-
sons who know only one of the 4,999 others. A few simple universal concepts—love, anger,
hunger, etc.—might be gotten across by pointing, nods, general sorts of sounds, but not
much else. Without a common language, our efforts to communicate resemble those used by
dogs and chimpanzees.7 
Socially transmitted rules differ among communities because the individual insights
out of which a community’s knowledge base is created tend to be path dependent, idiosyn-
cratic, and context specific. Cave dwellers had greater use for fire and food than linguistics
and economists—so more effort would go into teaching the rules most relevant for making
fires, undertaking hunting expeditions of various kinds, and preparing meals than in teaching
theories of language and relative prices. They would also put more effort into creating
sounds and symbols for fire, hunting, and cooking than for past participles and equilibrium
prices. Thus, there are significant differences in regional rules of life as is evident in differ-
ences among foodstuffs, cuisines, languages, housing, clothing, music, religions, and ethics. 
Such differences are evident throughout recorded history, and they are still commonplace; 
7 Once one knows that languages are possible and exist, one might attempt to learn another. Absent
a translator or teacher, the first steps in such a process also uses pointing, nods, and general sounds
to establish various if-then relationships between sounds and ideas, as with learning the names for
things and actions. In such cases, one hopes to gradually internalize these if-then relationships of the
new language so that more subtle forms of communication become possible.
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there are few Lutherans in Beijing and few Buddhists in Mecca, and there are Chicago and
Virginia schools of political economy.
Our measures for physical phenomena such as colors, temperatures, the seasons,
lightening, our periods of development, and the point at which one changes to another are
also largely products of lessons learned during our early education.8 Other rules learned as
we “grow up” affect our routines for judging what is important or interesting about a given
situation and the relative merits of alternatives. A hunter, farmer, geologist, architect, and
tourist do not look at the same place in the same way. Many of our learned rules were inter-
nalized at such an early age and have played such an important role in our understanding of
our self and the universe that they may be mistakenly regarded as “innate” or “hard wired.” 
although they are socially rather than genetically transmitted.
Socially “transmitted” rules tend to reduce variations within communities and amplify
them among communities. Socially transmitted rules form the basis of our civilized conduct
and civilizations. It is our gradual improvement in our understanding of the seasons, life cy-
cles, and of the things that can be done with fire, plants, animals, metals, and electrons that
account for our ability to dominate other species on the planet and to live relatively comfort-
able lives.
As the stock of knowledge increases and becomes more difficult to learn by watching
and listening to others, innovations in education often take place. After grounding ideas are
taught by one’s family and friends, children may be placed in an apprenticeship or under the
supervision of rule-teaching specialists such as teachers and preachers. As mass education
became commonplace, more of our if-then relationships were learned from such educational 
programs. This tends to increase the uniformity in our ideas about cosmology, chemistry,
economics, and ethics insofar as our teachers were trained in similar colleges and universi-
ties. We may, for example, all agree that the earth is round, rotates, and revolves around the
8 This list reflects differences among cultures in the names for colors, measurement of years, assess-
ment of ages and responsibilities associated with “growing up” (as for example with the youngest
age at which one can work for a living, marry, or vote). Many of these have varied through time
within a given society. Evidence that perceptions of color vary among individuals includes the phe-
nomenon of “color blindness,” and other psychological (Özgen and Davies [2002]) and physiologi-
cal evidence (Siok et. al [2009]).
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sun rather than the earth being flat and the sun rising in the East and setting in the West.
Most of us do so without direct knowledge of more than the latter. It is what we were
taught.
Of course, not all of the rules passed along are correct or complete, and so both ma-
jor and minor improvements in socially transmitted rules are always possible. It turned out
that neither the earth nor the sun was the center of the universe—although the earth and sun
are naturally centers of our attention.
C. Personally Modifying and Inventing Rules
The third process through which rules are acquired accounts for only a small subset
of our internalized rules, but the process through which such rules are developed is of major
significance.9 This process is the source of the rules that we create for ourselves through in-
sights, accidental discoveries, and trial and error. Such rules include minor revisions of one’s
genetically and socially transmitted rules as well as major insights about how the world is put
together. Minor innovations include how one organizes one’s room, unique aspects of one’s
diet and clothing, and idiosyncratic word usage and inflection. Major innovations include Ar-
istotelian, Newtonian, and Einsteinian physics; Smithian, Marxist, Marshallian, and Schum-
peterian economics; the wheel, printing press, and integrated circuit. The ability to create
slightly different rule-based systems make each of us a bit different from all others in our
communities and all others of our species. Although we have much in common, we are all 
unique—even twins exhibit many differences.
The set of self-made rules tends to be small relative to the others for many reasons
including our limited imagination and the fact that it is costly to revise one’s collection of
learned and inherited rules. Rules are not all independent of one another; thus changing one
rule often requires significant modifications to others to avoid undermining systems of rules
9 This claim can be contested. Insofar as our “selves” emerge gradually from our early education and 
biological development, subsequent learning is always a bit active and allows individuals to develop
their own interpretations of the lessons and information to which they were exposed. However, it is
clear that relative to our genotypes, this body of self-created knowledge is small. And, insofar as that 
which is transmitted socially is accumulated knowledge, privately created rules—even when subject




              
            
          
          
           
              
             
         
             
      
            
              
             
                
          
       
             
                  
                
              
                
            
                    
             
              
                 
                   
                 
                
that have worked tolerably well in the past. Moreover, there are emotional costs to changing
strongly internalized rules: one may feel intensely guilty or disoriented when one violates an 
“important” rule learned from one’s parents, ministers, or teachers.
Being conventional has both survival and social benefits. The rules passed on through
informal and formal educational systems reflect the innovations of many generations of per-
sons in the past, whose cumulative knowledge will naturally dwarf that of even the most
clever and unconventional man or woman. Because this is implicitly recognized, those who
violate conventions may be disparaged. Many innovations—perhaps most—are rejected be-
cause they conflict with other already internalized rules that seem to work reasonably well or
are valued by one’s community.
Nonetheless, without the innovations that do take place, there would be no conven-
tions, no rules to be transmitted socially. It is individual innovations that are ultimately the
source of all socially transmitted rules. Without innovations and the ability to pass them on
to others, we would all be entirely dependent on the essentially static systems of rules and
very limited ability to learn with which we were born.
D. Survivorship and the Realism of Rules
All three types of rules are affected by many tests associated with survivorship. Only
rules that actually work better than previous ones or at least appear to do so tend to survive
in the long run. This is true of biological rules including our species’s ability to recognize, im-
agine, learn, and communicate. It is also true of socially transmitted rules, including ones re-
garding diet, work, and play. It is also true of personally revised or adopted rules.
Of course, many mistakes are made by both mutation and by innovative individuals, 
but in the long run, these tend to be weeded out. A mutation may be fatal or simply do less
well than more commonplace genes at garnering the calories and mates necessary to be
transmitted to the next generation. A family or society may disappear because its rules in-
duce the wrong response to a crisis. A person may mistakenly believe that he or she can suc-
ceed by remaining asleep in bed, or that he or she can leap off of a cliff or tall building with-
out harm. The rule systems that produce such beliefs are not likely to be copied by others.
Rules that tend to produce poor results are far less likely to be transmitted to future
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generations than are rules that produce good ones. 
Thus, the quality of our information-processing rules, natural laws, and routines for
making choices tends to gradually improve through time. In this sense, our understandings
and expectations tend to become more “realistic” through time—that is, more consistent
with their survival and transmission to future generations—although individual rules and
rule systems may remain far from perfect.10 Such gradual progress is the basis of Hayek’s
(1973) and Burke’s (1790) defense of cultural conservatism.
Unfortunately, nonconvexities in what may be regarded as the rules-to-survivorship
function limit the extent to which small innovations can improve the systems of rules used
to understand our true opportunities in the universe as it is. Both individuals and community
adjustments tend to reach local maxima, rather than global ones—what Hayek (1973, pp.
99–100) refers to as dead ends. Aristotle’s theory of physics was used for centuries before it
was replaced with Newtonian physics and molecular chemistry. The medieval system of gov-
ernance and religion were stable systems of rules that required relatively large innovations— 
new ideas about both life and governance—to move from the medieval local maximum to
the modern one. This required both luck and innovation to achieve (Congleton 2011). 
Together survivorship and nonconvexities imply that our internalized rules and the
societies built on those foundations exhibit a good deal of realism and stability, although
they are not completely realistic or stable. The stability of our internalized rules implies that
we ourselves are stable—that we have stable dispositions—which makes us predictable
counterparts in life’s many social activities. That changes in one’s internalized rules are possi-
ble also allows social systems to evolve.
In the end, realism constrains our subjectivity and imagination. Survivorship implies
10 Dawkins (1989) originated the term “meme” and argued that ideas (memes) are similar to genes in
that they are subject to repeated tests and most pass most of them to survive through time. Thus, 
only “good” ideas—ideas that can propagate themselves—survive in the long run. This term has 
been extended to include other aspects of cultures by other scholars in the period that followed. 
This paper focuses on a subset of potential memes, namely rules, and in particular rules that can be
internalized. Although Dawkins coined the term “meme,” the idea of cultural evolution preceded 
Dawkins by at least a century. See Spencer (1851) for the first clear statement of social evolution. 
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that our internalized rules—even ones that may not appear to be rational—tend to provide
useful realistic assessments of the world and its possibilities.11 
IV. Putting the Pieces Together: A Model of Choice and Experience Under Internal-
ized Rules
Having described where internalized rules come from and why they tend to be realis-
tic and stable but imperfect, the next step is to provide a model of rule-bound choice.
Choices determine both physical and mental actions. They include single actions—picking
up a penny on the floor—and also long sequences of actions—as in a game of chess, travel 
from one country to another, career choices, the founding of a new company, or the writing
of a book. Decisions to engage in various mental activities include remembering the past,
sustained efforts to devise principles to account for past experience or to improve one’s fu-
ture choices, decisions to go to sleep or not, and also such matters as whether to continue
thinking about the ideas developed in this essay or not.12 
As a possible model of ongoing rule-bound processes of choice, consider the follow-
ing recursive process of winnowing and elimination. In the first phase, sensory data arrive,
and internalized rules are used to characterize general features of a choice setting, including
both key characteristics and possibilities for change. The “actual” or “status quo” is a subset
of the possible. Where specifically am I, what is possible, what is not? In the second phase
other rules are applied to determine the most important or relevant features of the choice
setting. It is those features that will be given significant attention. In the third phase, those
features—which include current conditions, possible choices and consequences—are evalu-
ated by various systems of rules that anticipate and evaluate the consequences associated
with physical and mental actions.
This winnowing process may yield a choice to engage in physical action (actions in
the outer world) or conclude that more data and evaluation are necessary before a choice can
be made (actions within one’s self). The latter, in effect, restarts the process at step 1 if more
11 See Frank (1988) for a book length exposition on the underlying rationality of many passions.
12 This is not to say that mental activities involve no physical changes—merely to say that such
changes are within ourselves, rather than in the world outside of ourselves.
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external data are gathered, or at step 2 if a better understanding of what is important is un-
dertaken, or step 3 if a clearer understanding of consequences and assessment of their rela-
tive merits seems worth additional time and attention. If the choice is to engage in additional 
winnowing and evaluation or to expand the range of possibilities considered, no external ac-
tions are necessary. New “data” can be produced within the mind without additional sensory
input as old data are processed. When physical actions are undertaken, additional sensory
data are generated, which also reinitiates the process. The process of choice occupies most
of our waking hours. It is not a once in a lifetime event.
Essentially every choice—excepting suicidal ones—is subject to ongoing re-evalua-
tion and revision. We do not close our eyes when walking from point A to point B, even in
cases in which we “know” where our feet should be placed on the way from A to B. Instead, 
we continually update and judge whether we are making progress and adjust the placement
of our feet and hands, and so on, until B is reached. Our awareness that we engage in such
ongoing data collection, updating, and decision making is what is meant by self-awareness.
As Descartes aptly put it, “I think therefore I am” (Cogito, ergo sum).13 
13 That such ongoing decision making is not part of the homo economicus model is a weakness of
that model, but also a strength. By treating decisions as once and forever events, the number of fac-
tors that need to be modeled (taken into account) is greatly reduced, which facilitates reaching clear
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Figure 1: Identifying, Screening, Evaluating,
 and Choosing among Possibilities
Sensory
Data
Figure 1 illustrates the case in which this process of winnowing leads to a physical ac-
tion. It is essentially a Venn diagram with an associated feedback loop. Each step in the pro-
cess uses systems of if-then relationships to reduce the domain of possibilities focused on in
the next step. The process begins with sensory data and rules that discern one’s situation
(choice setting) from that data. Those rules may be said to determine which part of the uni-
verse the choice takes place within. The second step uses rules to identify the most im-
portant (salient) features of that setting and the alternatives worthy of more attention. The
third step applies more fine-grained rules to more carefully assess the relative merits of the
most important and relevant possibilities: What should I actually do? Should I just follow my
routines for this setting? Or, should I try something new? If so, what? All three steps can be
regarded as “winnowing,” a process of eliminating alternatives from one’s attention. 
Note that this process is not simply an evaluative process. Steps 2 and 3 require antic-
ipating the actions that one can undertake and their likely consequences, both of which re-
quire an understanding of natural laws. Deciding which courses of action are worthy of at-
tention also requires evaluation, and this is undertaken with various combinations of practi-
cal, aesthetic, and moral rules.
The amount of attention devoted to making a decision varies with the apparent im-
portance of the physical or mental actions that may be undertaken and their associated
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consequences. If speed seems important, the three steps will be done quickly without much
analysis. If the choice seems to be a major one and speed is not important, several days— 
indeed years—may be spent identifying, winnowing down and evaluating alternatives. A de-
cision to pursue a career, change religions, or marry someone will be given more attention
than choosing a drink or meal at a restaurant or choosing a salutation when leaving friends at
a restaurant.
Fortunately, we do not confront very many major choices. In a stable life, we mostly
confront familiar choice settings, settings in which our standing routines work well. In such
settings, our routines require only minor fine tuning for the oddities of a given time or place.
As Hayek (1973) and Newell & Simon (1972) noted, such routines and rubrics free one’s
time and attention for other more significant or consequential decisions—or simply for
pleasant day-dreaming.
In cases in which the action is physical, new sensory data are generated by the action
which provides additional evidence about the consequences of the action, which allows our
expectations and plans to be updated. If the results are more or less as anticipated, the plan
of action is likely to be continued. If not, some “course corrections” may be undertaken—a 
pothole may be avoided, a crazy (non-norm-following) pedestrian dodged, the weather ad-
justed for or not, and so on. In other case, more analysis and reflection is necessary, because
our standing routines work less well, as when one visits a foreign country for the first time or
hears a new language, or experiences a major surprise.
In cases in which the course of action is internal—as with mental actions to “test” the
coherence, generality, and consistency of a new theory or idea—new “data” are generated
without sensory inputs, but the process of decision making is similar. Relevant details and
alternatives are focused on, and winnowing takes place until a plausible rule, principle, or
theory is identified or not and adopted or not. 
The rules applied in each stage in the process may differ according to the choice set-
ting at hand. For example, choice settings in warfare and romance are often said to differ
from those in peace or in meetings between strangers. This is, of course, the implicit mean-
ing of the expression “all is fair and love and war.” Context-specific rules apply different
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criteria to identify possibilities and rank them according to the circumstances at hand.
For the purposes of this essay, the highly simplified model presented above is suffi-
cient. It includes the major features of decision making stressed in Buchanan’s work, without
becoming nihilistic or solipsistic. It is also largely consistent with evidence from psychology
and neural science. A more finely grained analysis would attempt to better understand the
rule systems that an individual uses at each step in the winnowing process. Such efforts at-
tract a good deal of attention in psychology and neurology and many book-length analyses
have been undertaken, but such an analysis is not possible in a short essay nor likely to be of
interest to its anticipated readership.14 
V. Parallels between Self and Political Constitutions
This subsection discusses parallels between self-constitutions and political constitu-
tions. Such parallels are hinted at in a few clauses and asides in Buchanan’s work but never
really developed. A political constitution characterizes an organization with the authority to
create and impose rules on persons within a particular territory. As organizations, govern-
ments are inherently rule bound, although the rules are not all written down. Their written
constitutions specify the general process through which the government’s leadership is cho-
sen and major policy decisions are to be made. Many of the details, however, are left to be
worked out by the government—as for example, the internal organization of parliament and
election laws are often left unspecified by the constitutions of liberal democracies.
Both self- and political constitutions have hierarchies of rules and standing proce-
dures for decision making; they also continually collect data and update their decisions. New
policies are adopted and old ones revised every year. Constitutional rules limit the kinds of
processes that can be used to make policy decisions by the persons elected to high office and
14 Hayek(1952), Pinker (1999), and Seligman et al (2016), for example, include book-length over-
views of research on how the mind operates. Pinker notes that the human mind is adept at recogniz-
ing a wide range of shapes and objects—a very difficult capacity for computer programmer to repli-
cate, but one that is far easier to do than many others that humans routinely undertake. His short
discussion of the if-then systems of rules that loosely describe how the mind recognizes faces, 
places, and shapes of object takes more pages than included in this essay. And, Pinker deals only
with capacities that he believes to be innate rather than learned. 
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to a lesser extent by officials holding offices at lower levels of government. A constitution’s
rules are stable, which is to say they are binding and not subject to repeated or rapid change, 
although they can be revised (amended).
A liberal constitution usually includes formal limits on the kinds of rules that can law-
fully be adopted. In the U.S. constitution, the Bill of Rights limits the types of laws that can
be produced by national legislatures and regulatory agencies. Its amendment procedures im-
ply that such constraints can be changed, but both popular support for such reforms and the
amendment procedure assures that neither the Bill of Rights nor the organization of govern-
ance are likely to be rapidly and repeatedly reformed. They are not chiseled into stone but
sufficiently stable to be taken as “relatively absolute absolutes” to use Buchanan’s phrase.
Although political scientists and political economists often classify governments into
two or three categories such as democracies, autocracies, and totalitarian regimes, a nation’s
political constitution is more complex than that coarse categorization. There is a continuum 
in the extent and division of authority to government and among office holders.
The “rules of the political game” are so complex and nuanced that they are rarely
fully understood by those who are active participants in politics. For example, authority over
policy is often divided up in many ways. Most legislative systems are recursive in the sense
that there are many “loops” of review, revision, and selection that take place before an idea
becomes law or policy. A proposal may be made by a single person or small group, then it is
reviewed, revised, and voted on by another person or committee, then the same sequence
occurs again with votes by yet another person or committee, which initiates another cycle of
review, revision, and voting, and so on, until a bill becomes law or policy (or not). Veto
power exists within subcommittees, committees, the legislature as a whole, and the govern-
ment’s chief executive (king, prime minister, chancellor, or president). Policy-making author-
ity is further distributed among unelected staff within the legislative and executive branch
and among bureaus and bureaucrats.
The hierarchical nature of government allows attention to be focused on the “top-
level review” which in some cases may be that undertaken by voters (as in constitutional ref-
erenda) and in others the decisions of elected officials. The term “democracy” is often used
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as a useful summary or approximation for the process of governance whenever the top offi-
cials are all directly or indirectly selected by voters in competitive elections. However, this
top-down model of policy making is a highly simplified model of the complex decentralized
process that actually produces suggestions for reform, evaluates such reforms, and imple-
ments any new laws and regulations adopted.
The model of rule-bound choice is similar in all respects to that of a political consti-
tution except that only a single person is involved in the decisions reached. One’s internal 
rules are hierarchical and veto power and agenda control often exists at several levels of our
internal processes of reflection and winnowing. Several independent systems of rules may
veto a course of action. One may reject an action or sequence of actions because it is too
dangerous, takes too long, or is immoral.
An internalized collection of rules can be revised, but the process is costly and thus
relatively few major reforms are undertaken. Many—perhaps most—of our internalized
rules are sufficiently stable that a person’s “personality” can be said to last a lifetime. Even
relatively unimportant mannerisms change slowly in most cases after adulthood is reached. 
Major revisions are occasionally observed after a personal crisis—as is also true of political 
constitutions—but both are rare and not always successful. 
Hypotheses that include stable rules, hierarchies, recursiveness, and gradual reform 
are all commonplace in psychological theories. For example, Freud regarded the mind as a 
loose hierarchy of decision-making authority, with the superego, ego and id (Freud
1923/2018). Maslow (1943) stressed the hierarchical nature of what he referred to as needs.
Seligman et al. (2016) used a similar hierarchy of virtues and dispositions to identify traits
that contribute to a good life. Such hierarchies imply that some aims or aspects of character
development are given attention before others.
There are also coarse classifications of personality types undertaken by psychologists
that are similar in many ways to those used by political scientists to classify governments.
For example, Myers-Briggs (1962) developed widely used categorizations of “personality
types” based on Jung’s (1923) theory of types. Such types are accounted for in the present
theory as differences in the constellations of internalized rules that characterize each person’s
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self-constitution. Another typography (Adorno et al. 1950) regards some persons to be au-
thoritarian, which makes the connection between politics and psychology explicit. Such cate-
gories tend to be rough because they somewhat divide up what most will acknowledge to be
a continuum in to discrete subsets. Such classifications are nonetheless useful for many pur-
poses, as is the case for coarse classifications of colors, heights, weights, and age. 
As true of the processes of government, many of our own standing procedures for
making decisions are so complex that neither we, nor psychologists, can fully understand
them. Pinker (1999) stressed their recursive and evolutionary—but still not fully under-
stood—nature.15 The still-mysterious parts of the process of self-governance and decision
making can be regarded as judgement or intuition for the purposes of this essay, and they
play nontrivial roles at every point in the process of identifying alternatives, focusing atten-
tion on a subset of the alternatives, and taking whatever course of action is decided upon.
VI. Revising and Generalizing Internalized Rules
Recognition of the temporal dimensionality of choice provides one ‘‘reason for
rules’’—rules that will impose binding constraints on choice options after the rules
themselves have been established. That is to say, in either a private-choice or a pub-
lic-choice role, persons may choose to restrict their own futures, and such behavior
may be wholly rational (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985, p. 77).
That a subset of our “soft-wired” rules are products of our unique experiences, as-
sessments of that experience, and epiphanies about alternatives never experienced has sev-
eral important implications. It implies that a person’s constitution—one’s complex system of
rules—is not entirely “given,” but evolves through time as one makes choices, observes con-
sequences, and reassesses the relative merits of the rules already in one’s mind. This evolu-
tion is bounded by one’s physical and mental capacities, but the bounds are sufficiently large
to allow for a huge range of variation in individuals. As positive and normative rules are ad-
justed or extended to new circumstances, we become somewhat different persons because
15 Although the model of self-governance sketched out above is consistent with all of the above psy-
chological theories, the homo constitutionalus perspective developed in this paper is most similar to
what Pinker refers to as the computational-evolutionary model of the mind, although without com-




              
     
   
              
              
             
              
               
              
           
    
               
           
              
           
          
     
           
             
              
                  
            
               
          
                
           
                
                
              
we understand the world and behave a bit differently than our former selves—a point men-
tioned several times in Buchanan’s writings.
A. Self-Evolution
How much we change through time depends in part on experiences, partly on one’s
grounding norms with respect to tradition and innovations, and partly on one’s ability and
will to change oneself, which like other abilities varies somewhat among individuals. It is also
limited by the same processes that support the internalization of rules. To unlearn or over-
ride if-then relationships can be very difficult. Even simply retraining oneself to drive on the
left rather than the right side of the road—which involves revising a relatively small number
of if-then relationships and ought-tos—is disorienting and time consuming, although most
people can do so.
The more central and important the rules under revision are to one’s sense of the
universe and self, the more “connections” (e.g., supportive and cross-linking if-then relation-
ships) one must overturn and the greater the emotional costs and time and attention re-
quired to undertake a successful revision of one’s self-constitution. To withdraw from a
comfortable romance, career, religion, or ideology—even when experience implies one
should—can be nearly impossible.
As a consequence, our selves exhibit considerable stability, continuity, and path de-
pendence. One’s persona in retirement is not so different from that in one’s middle-aged pe-
riod, which is not so different from that in one’s twenties. When two acquaintances meet af-
ter not seeing each other for a decade, a very common remark is “you haven’t change a bit,”
–which is to say their personalities—their systems of if-then rules—is still fundamentally the
same as it was 10 years before. Of course, there are also exceptions, persons who have sig-
nificantly changed their rules for understanding, screening, evaluating, and acting. Such
changes happen to us all as we “grow up” but occur less frequently within adults.
For people who substantially revise their internal constitutions, meetings of old
friends elicit comments such as “you’re so different” or “I liked you better when you were
your old self.” Change is always possible, but changes are evidently easier at some stages of
life and settings than others, and for some systems of internalized rules than others.
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B. Principles as Generalizations of Context-Specific Rules
The context-specificity of many of our internalized rules implies that some rules work
less well when our choice settings change. As rule failures are noticed, “amendments” to our
internal constitutions may be considered and adopted—not all of them consciously so. The
aim of such reforms is to refine one’s existing rule systems so that they work better in the
new circumstances, where “betterness” is judged via other internalized rules, including ones
that induce one to defer to the opinions of others or tradition. 
In the course of such amendments, it is likely to be noticed that some rules are more
general than others in the sense that they work well in a greater variety of circumstances. Be-
cause it takes time to develop new rules and mistakes are made before new rule systems are
fully worked out, general rules have obvious advantages. They allow individuals to more eas-
ily and effectively live in new choice settings. 
As the value of general rules comes to be recognized, some individuals may devote time
and attention to discerning and developing such rules. Such persons may be called wise, 
thoughtful, or insightful. They attempt to generalize the rules most people appear to use by
identifying common strengths and weaknesses of those rules. They may also recognize how
existing rules can be revised to broaden their applicability. When one seeks advice from such
a person, it is often because one’s existing rules cannot be easily generalized to new circum-
stances. Scientists, philosophers, and theologians all attempt to discern such increasingly
general if-then relationships, but everyone does this to some extent.
When more general rules are discovered, efforts may be made to persuade others to
adopt the new rules. Persuading others to adopt new rules or general principles is not an easy
task, even when the proposed new rule is actually an improvement. Truly general “princi-
ples” are always more general than useful at the time they are developed. Their usefulness is
evident only after choice settings change. Moreover, many proposed generalizations prove to
be false and provide little if any improvement over narrower rules when circumstances actu-
ally do change.
As long as new rules yield essentially the same choices in the choice settings most often
experienced as the old rules, why invest the time and energy necessary to master new, more
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general rules? This natural conservatism is one of the reasons that individual dispositions and
cultures evolve slowly and incrementally rather than in great leaps. How often does it matter
whether the sun rises in the East or the earth rotates clockwise at a constant speed while the
sun remains in place? In spite of the revolution induced by Copernicus five centuries ago, 
most of us still use the expressions “sunrise” and “sunset” rather than “first and last sun
sight” or equivalent phrases describing our rotational journey to a point where the sun can
be seen or not.
Nonetheless, many rules are gradually refined and generalized. This is true of natural 
laws that are developed to characterize relationships in the external world, ethical rules that
characterize moral conduct and the good life, and principles for selecting new rules or revis-
ing old ones. 
VII. Rationality as a Principle for Rules and Decision Making
“Rationality” and “consistency” are two such higher-level principles for evaluating rules. 
Proponents of rationality insist that one’s theories and overall pattern of choice should be as
free from contradiction as possible. Freedom from internal contradiction is facilitated
through the use of general rules. Freedom from contradiction in one’s choices is facilitated
by carefully considering the consequences associated with one’s actions. Because one’s inter-
nalized rules are largely assembled in a haphazard way from family, friends, and others in
one’s community, they are not necessarily or even usually entirely consistent with one an-
other. Some rules, for example, may encourage “living for today” and others “planning
ahead.” Rationality is thus not simply a consequence of being human but of conscious effort
and survivorship insofar as consistent natural laws exist. For example, enlightenment schol-
ars used various consistency tests to discard a wide variety of medieval customs and conven-
tions that “didn’t make sense,” “were overly complicated,” or were “insufficiently general.”
All individuals that accept the rationality principle attempt to reach conclusions that are
self-consistent, realistic, and universal. Nonetheless, rationality by itself does not induce
complete convergence in the rules used by devotees of rationality. Aristotle and Adam Smith
were both scholars who employed rational methodologies, but they wrote at different times,
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experienced very different lives, and read quite different books and stories. Their lists and
theories of virtue are similar, but not identical, as noted by Smith himself. Bentham’s and
Kant’s ethical theories were developed at roughly the same time and were both grounded in
the rationality principle. However, they reach different conclusions about the domain of
moral choice and one’s moral duties within those domains. 
In contrast to devotees of the rationality principle, other persons may acknowledge the
usefulness of the rationality principle for some purposes but insist that it is not a universal 
guide for conduct or for selecting rules. Such persons will attempt to be rational only in cir-
cumstances in which it appears to be especially useful. As a consequence, they will exhibit
rationality (realism, generality, and consistency) in some of their decisions but not others.
They might, for example, rationally undertake the design of a house, their career, and fi-
nancial planning but make no effort to be consistent when engaging in hobbies, romance, or
conversations with friends and family. They might watch a football game on television alone,
but still cheer out loud when their favorite team scores or prevents their opponent from 
scoring. Other screening and evaluative rules would be used in choice settings in which ra-
tionality does not appear to be especially useful.
Persons who are “less than rational,” may still exhibit a great deal of consistency in their
choices, but that consistency emerges from properties of the rules that they have internal-
ized, rather than from self-conscious efforts to “rationalize” their routines and intuitions.16 
Contradictory rules often fail the test of time, because they tend to be mistake and regret
prone. Screening and evaluative rules that often contradict one another also tend to consume
time and attention as contradictions are sorted out and regrets accumulate. Inconsistent rules
thus tend to be revised or replaced with more general and realistic rules through time be-
cause they work better, rather than because they are “rational.” This evolutionary aspect of
16 The “framing effect” identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) may be regarded as information
that induces one to use one set of evaluative principles rather than another. That choices change be-
cause of framing implies that the overall collection of evaluative rules is not entirely self-consistent
(transitive). Nonetheless, within a particular type of choice setting (frame), choices may still be self-
consistent on average—sufficiently so that economic models can shed useful light on behavior.
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the rules that parents pass on to their children tends to produce more internal consistency
than the persons using those rules realize.
Both devotees of rationality and others may recognize that part of their behavior is “irra-
tional” or “nonrational,” which is to say inconsistent with forward-looking, realistic, con-
sistent analysis of one’s interests and of the means for promoting them. Among rationalists,
such irrational choices would be regarded as errors or evidence of weakness of will. Among
nonrationalists, such irrational behavior may be celebrated as a type of freedom from their
own internalized rules and routines. In either case, the irrational is recognized only because
rational choices are known to be possible.
In choice settings in which one’s rules are entirely self-consistent, the results of behavior
can be represented using the utility-maximizing model. Even though no conscious effort to
maximize “utility” has been undertaken, the theory of “revealed preference” implies that any
pattern of self-consistent behavior can be characterized with a utility function.17 The utility-
maximizing models of economics and game theory are thus perfectly reasonable models of
choice in settings in which one’s rules are consistent with one another. This could well be
the case within grocery stores and investment banks.
For devotees of rationality, such domains may be quite large, and they will be embar-
rassed by cases in which inconsistencies emerge. For others, there will be choice settings in
which consistency is evident, but their overall pattern of decisions will exhibit many incon-
sistencies as, for example, different systems of rules are applied to make choices in different
types of choice settings.
VIII. Does Homo Constitutionalus Solve Problems Associated with Conventional Ra-
tional Choice Models?
The individual is presumed to be facing the following question: What ethical rule
shall I adopt as a guide to my behavior in subsequent actions? There are two alterna-
tives before him. He can adopt a rule, which we shall call “the moral law,” or he can
adopt a rule which, loosely, we shall call “the private maxim.” By selecting the first, 
the individual commits himself to act in subsequent situations on the basis of some-





    
  
              
              
           
               
                
                
              
      
              
          
               
           
             
               
           
              
              
            
             
              
              
             
              
   
                                            
   
   
thing like the generalization principle…By selecting the second rule instead, he com-
mits himself in advance to no particular principle of behavior. He retains full free-
dom to act on the basis of expedient considerations in each particular instance that
arises. (Buchanan 1965, p. 2).
The rule-based model of human choice sketched out above can be regarded as a gen-
eralization of the utility-maximizing model, one that includes that model as a special case but
that can account for inconsistencies and personal and cultural evolution. Choices remain
purposeful but now include choices about which rules to internalize and how to apply the
various rules one has internalized. That we are aware that our own systems of rules are im-
perfect also makes sense of various products such as self-help books that make little sense in
the utility-maximizing model. That we have the ability to learn and internalize rules makes
the “self” and “self-interest” partly endogenous.
There are many cases in which people fail to behave as predicted by utility maximiza-
tion, but which are predictable under the homo constitutionalus model. For example, experi-
ments on a variety of social dilemmas find far more cooperative and ethical behavior than
can be accounted for by narrow self-interest, ignorance, or confusion.18 Economic experi-
menters believe that their subjects attempt to maximize monetary rewards, because this is
what homo economicus would do in such circumstances. Yet, in many cases, most of the sub-
jects in the experiments behave in other ways—they fail to “properly” optimize. 
However, if moral rules and similar norms affect behavior, then the manner of play
also matters. Homo constitutionalus will assess the relative merits of actions with practical and
moral interests in mind. The rewards associated with small monetary payments can easily be
less than the rewards of playing in accordance with one’s internalized norms—or with rou-
tines that have been profitably used in other circumstances. The cost of such moral or rou-
tine behavior in most experiments is a trivial reduction in one’s monetary payoffs. Indeed, if
one plays with other moral persons, the payoffs are often increased by such “irrationality.”
Differences in the behavior among subjects can largely be explained by differences in their
internalized rules.19 
18 See, for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1884), Andreoni (1995), or Pinker (1999).
19 See for example, Vanberg and Congleton (1992) or Wilson et al. (2012).
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Another puzzle for the homo-economicus model is the framing effect(s) identified by
Tversky and Kahneman (1982, 1984). Subjects were found to make choices among risky out-
comes according to the manner in which the setting and risks were described. Homo economi-
cus would be unaffected by such “framing effects” because he, she, or it always maximizes
expected income or utility. Homo constitutionalus, in contrast, is subject to framing effects
whenever the rules used to select among alternatives are context specific. Framing in such
cases determines which rules are applied, which determines the choices ultimately made. The
existence of framing effects is a predictable consequence of internalized rule systems that are
context specific and not entirely self-consistent.
That one’s internalized systems of rules imperfectly account for laboratory settings is
not surprising, because one’s internalized rule systems emerged for other choice environ-
ments and are not likely to be perfect for the lab. If laboratory settings became common-
place for individuals, their internalized systems of rules would gradually be revised in the di-
rection that maximizes the rewards of lab performance—which might still include a variety
of other considerations than the small monetary rewards on offer.
IX. The Rule-Based Sensory Order: A Model of Everything?
There is a sense in which this short essay covers just about everything, and it is meant
to. By defining rules as “if-then relationships,” it clarifies what is meant by the somewhat
loose usage of the term “rules” that characterizes most papers about rules. By doing so, it re-
minds readers of the many types of if-then relationships that we use every day. The laws of
natural and social science are rules in this sense. Most laws enforced by government have
this character, as do most ethical principles and moral maxims, and many of our rubrics and
routines. Our capacities for internalizing and revising rules have generated the rule systems
that we each use to understand the world, determine possibilities, and decide what to do. 
Choices are influenced by a variety of if-then relationships—not all of which are sub-
ject to our control—but many of which are. Without our abilities to gradually learn and im-
prove our understandings of natural laws and our own interests, self-improvement and hu-
man progress would be impossible. And, there would be little that an individual could do be-
yond the mandates of their genetic makeup. We would all be ants or monkeys, rather than
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humans. It is our ability to use our understanding of if-then relationships to change both
ourselves and the world we live in that demonstrates that individual choices matter.
With respect to social science, that rules can be learned and revised and used to guide
decisions has a variety of implications. If common rules exist, both social sciences and psy-
chology are possible. Without such rules, human behavior could not be expressed as condi-
tional propensities or natural laws, and only vague statistical predictions would be possible. 
That differences exist among our internalized rules accounts for the individuality of human
experience, the limits of social science, and the irreducible error terms of both social science
and psychology.
With respect to economics and political economy, the internalization of rules has a
number of implications. If all the rule-based systems internalized by individuals are internally
consistent and aim only for survival, income, and domination, the utility-based models that
are widely employed may be sufficient to understand human nature. However, when the
rules internalized include moral principles, lack consistency, and change through time, analy-
sis that assumes narrow self-interest will be limited in its ability to explain human behavior,
social outcomes, or human progress. 
The model developed in this essay stresses the subjectivity and individuality of experi-
ence, but it does not imply that “anything can happen,” as some scholars stressing subjectiv-
ism tend to. Rather, the biological and social evolutionary foundations of our inherited and
learned rules imply that many, perhaps most, of our grounding rules have survival value: they
address commonplace problems associated with the emergence of homo sapiens as a species
and the subsequent emergence of civil society. The rules for understanding the world—our
sensory order—have to be realistic, and our rules for assessing our interests must actually
tend to do so if they are to be passed on to others.
The rules we invent for ourselves in developed societies are less constrained by survi-
vorship pressures, but even here there are limits on the rules one can apply in everyday life. 
Many less than life-threatening delusions are compatible with survival in societies that live
well away from the margins of survival. Self-delusion in such societies is not necessarily fatal.
In prosperous societies, the evolution of rules is propelled by other higher-level principles
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that can be used to separate “crazy” from “realistic” or “reasonable” rules. Rationality is one
such principle, although it is not the only one. That the rationality principle has been more
widely taught and so has become more widely internalized during the past two centuries. 
This may well be the best explanation for the acceleration of prosperity that took place dur-
ing the same period. Rules that are realistic allow one to more accurately anticipated the
consequences of one’s actions, which clearly helps to improve plans of all sorts whenever
consequences matter.
Overall, this essay is one that Buchanan might well have enjoyed and had sympathy
with, although that can no longer be known with any certainty. However, its aim is not to
obtain his imagined approval but to integrate and extend some ideas from his work and con-
nect them with others from philosophy and evolutionary psychology. The result is a coher-
ent model of man, one that accounts for our individual sensory orders, commonalities
among them, and behavior that cannot easily be brought into the utility-maximizing models 
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